Abstract: We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. Using ex-post mortality, we analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year. Applying this strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.
Introduction
The disability insurance (DI) program has become one of the largest income maintenance programs in modern welfare states.
1 Autor (2011) shows that, in the US, the share of 25-to 64-year olds receiving benefits from the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) increased from 2.3 to 4.6% between 1989 and 2009, and the SSDI Trust Fund is projected to be exhausted between 2015 and 2018. Sweden has also experienced large growth in disability benefits recipiency. Between 1985 and , the share of 30-to 64-year olds receiving disability benefits increased from 8 to 12%. The variation in program inflow over this period was large, but the reasons for the fluctuations are not fully understood.
Policy makers have two main instruments for governing the inflow to the DI program. Program generosity affects the attractiveness of the program and can be modified through changes in the compensation level or the cap on benefits. Program availability affects the likelihood of being awarded benefits and depends on screening stringency, which includes formal eligibility criteria as well as the implementation of program rules. While eligibility criteria are easily modified at the political level, the control of the implementation process is likely to be imperfect. Caseworker discretion and internal processes at the Social Insurance Agency are important in the eligibility determination process but are difficult for the insurance provider to monitor. Because of variation in implementation over time, the control of program inflow may change also during periods when no reforms at the political level are being pursued.
Empirical studies focusing on labor market effects of compensation levels and/or screening stringency have generally come to the conclusion that both policy instruments are important. However, the magnitude of the estimated effects varies to a large extent.
2 A potential reason for the observed differences across time and countries is that the effects of changes in stringency can depend on the compensation level and, similarly, the impact of changes in the compensation level can depend on the current level of screening stringency. It is, therefore, important to be cognizant of both formal rules as well as their implementation to get a full understanding of why the magnitude of labor market effects induced by DI reforms differs. Screening stringency has been recognized as one of the most important determinants of the growth of the DI program.
3 Several studies have analyzed the effects of changes to formal eligibility criteria. Autor and Duggan (2003) use the 1984 liberalization of the disability determination process in the US together with an unforeseen increase in the effective replacement rate and declined demand for less skilled workers and find a substantial impact of these forces on labor force participation of high school dropouts. Karlström, Palme, and Svensson (2008) study the removal of looser eligibility criteria for workers aged 60-64 in Sweden in 1997 and find no effect on employment but a spillover effect to other social insurance programs. Staubli (2011) analyzes the effect of tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age in Austria in 1996. He finds a substantial decline in disability enrollment and an increase in employment, but also spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance programs.
Other studies have exploited variation in the strictness of the eligibility screening process. Gruber and Kubik (1997) use the disability funding crisis in the US in the late 1970s, which induced a sharp increase in initial denial rates. Exploiting variation across US states, they find that stricter screening significantly increased labor force participation among older men. De Jong, Lindeboom, and van der Klaauw (2011) use a large-scale experiment in the Netherlands in which caseworkers in certain regions were instructed to increase the screening of disability benefit applications. They find a reduction in long-term sickness absence and DI applications from stricter screening, without negative spillover effects on the utilization of the unemployment insurance.
Previous studies have thus mainly analyzed the effects of known changes to screening stringency, affecting the eligibility criteria or the implementation of program rules, and have to a large extent concluded that such changes are important for program growth. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies changes in screening stringency over time. The question is whether fluctuations in the inflow to the DI program can be explained by changes in the underlying health of the population, or whether they are due to changes in the control of program inflow. We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the DI program has been governed over time, by comparing the health of individuals admitted to the program to the health of individuals not admitted. This approach allows us to control for changes in the underlying health when estimating fluctuations in program entry.
Health, however, is difficult to measure. Self-rated health measures are subjective and likely to suffer from measurement error. Furthermore, self-rated health tends to be endogenous to labor supply choices, in the sense that individuals receiving disability benefits are more prone to report an impaired work capacity. 4 An objective measure of health that is accurately measured through population censuses and is difficult to fake is mortality. Information about mortality is also available in many countries and for long time periods, which facilitates comparisons across countries and over time. The immediate mortality of new disability beneficiaries is certainly low and not very informative. However, we measure the health of individuals entering the program and compare it to the health individuals not entering the program in the same year, using the ex-post mortality from all years in which the individuals are observed in the future. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Swedish DI system. Section 3 outlines a theoretical model of the application decision to the DI program. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy and the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Swedish disability insurance system
The Swedish DI program replaces foregone earnings due to a lasting reduced working capacity for workers aged 19-64. The DI program was moved from the public pension system to the social insurance system as part of a public pension reform in 2003 and before then, individuals could be granted disability benefits from age 16. The formal eligibility criteria were unchanged at this time, but disability benefits were split by age into two parts with slightly different regulation, depending on whether the individual was below or above age 30. In this paper, we focus on disability benefits for the age group 30-64.
Disability benefits can be granted part-time or full-time, depending on the extent of the work impairment. The compensation rate is 64% of the assumed income, up to a ceiling. The level of benefits has remained fairly constant over time. Before 2003, benefits were calculated according to the formula that applied to old-age pension. The average level of compensation was, however, similar before and after 2003. Disability benefits can be supplemented with payments from occupational insurances, covering the majority of Swedish workers.
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Taking occupational insurances into account, disability benefits compare well with the level of benefits in other social insurance programs like sickness insurance, which replaces foregone earnings due to a temporarily reduced working capacity, and unemployment insurance. The reassessment of working capacity is also least strict in the DI program, making it a desirable route for individuals who want to stop working permanently.
5 The total compensation rate, including occupational insurances, is about 80% for workers in the private and local government sector and about 85% for workers in the central government sector, for earnings below the ceiling. Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö (2007) estimate that 96% of Swedish workers are covered by a collective agreement allowing for occupational insurance and that almost all of these workers fulfill the criteria for receiving occupational insurance. Between 60 and 80% of workers claim occupational insurance when receiving disability benefits.
The basis in the eligibility determination process is a clear relationship between medical causes and the reduction in working capacity. During certain time periods and for certain groups of workers consideration could also be given to the individual's labor market situation. From 1972 to October 1991, individuals aged 60-64 could be granted disability benefits for pure labor market reasons, without a health assessment, if they were still unemployed when reaching the time limit in the unemployment insurance. From 1970 to January 1997, special rules for workers aged 60-64 further implied less strict health assessments, no test of employability and lower requirements for changing occupation or area of residence in order to find work. During the same time period, workers of all ages could be granted disability benefits for labor market reasons and health reasons combined, if they suffered from a reduced working capacity for medical reasons and had been unemployed for 1-2 years. Since 1997, individual job opportunities should not be taken into account in the eligibility determination for disability benefits. In 2005, the 21 regional offices of the Social Insurance Agency were integrated into one central authority. In the same year, the reassessment of eligibility for disability beneficiaries became stricter. In July 2008, the eligibility criteria to the program were substantially tightened.
The development of program participation in the DI is presented in Figure 1 . The solid line, plotted against the left axis, shows the share of individuals aged 30-64 receiving disability benefits. The dashed line, plotted against the right axis, shows the disability benefit entry rate among the individuals not already receiving benefits. Between 1985 and 2008, the share of disability beneficiaries increased from just over 8% to about 12%, but the fluctuations in the entry rate were large. The rate of entry was high during the late 1980s and early 1990s, The share of individuals receiving disability benefits and the disability benefit entry rate in ages 30-64 in Sweden, 1985 30-64 in Sweden, -2008 Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program declined during the mid 1990s and increased rapidly during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Since the mid 2000s, there has been a remarkable drop in the disability benefit entry rate, which has even resulted in a decline in the participation rate in recent years. The reasons for the fluctuations in the disability benefit entry rate over time are not fully understood.
The model
In this section, we present a stylized model of an individual's application decision to the DI program. We focus on screening stringency as a key determinant of program inflow. In the model, an individual decides whether to apply for disability benefits or whether to continue working. If the individual applies and the individual's health is lower than the disability benefit threshold, the individual receives disability benefits. If the application is rejected, the individual is assumed to return to employment. There is an application cost which is increasing in the individual's wage. Let m it ¼ m t þ μ it be the disability benefit threshold that individual i faces at calendar time t, where m t is the average disability benefit threshold and μ it is an idiosyncratic error term, with zero mean, a cumulative distribution function FðÁÞ and a probability density function f ðÁÞ. The average disability benefit threshold, m t , is known by the individual.
When the individual applies for disability benefits, the caseworker can observe the individual's health, h it . If the health is below the disability benefit threshold the individual faces, m it , then the individual is awarded disability benefits.
The expected value from applying for disability benefits is given by
where V AC ðÁÞ is the value of the application for disability benefits being accepted, V RJ ðÁÞ is the value of the application being rejected, CðÁÞ is the application cost and
is the probability of the application being accepted. It follows that the probability of obtaining disability benefits is decreasing in health and increasing in the average disability benefit threshold. The value of an accepted application for disability benefits, V AC , is increasing in the individual's health, h it , and the wage, w it . The latter comes from the fact that the individual's consumption, when receiving disability benefits, is given by δw it , where δ is the compensation rate. The value of a rejected application for disability benefits, V RJ , is also increasing in health and wage. We assume that the individual returns to employment and earns the wage w it when being denied disability benefits. The application cost is increasing in the wage. This reflects the fact that in order to apply for disability benefits, for example in the US, the applicant has to leave his or her current employment and forego wage earnings. In Sweden, many individuals are on sick-leave when applying for disability benefits, which is more costly for high income earners.
We can now determine when it is optimal for the individual to apply for disability benefits. The individual applies for disability benefits if the difference between the value of applying and the value of working is positive, i.e. if
where the value of working is increasing in both health and wage. We assume that in the worst health state it is optimal for the individual to apply for disability benefits while in the best health state it is optimal to work.
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Defining h as the lowest and h as the highest possible health state, we can express these assumptions as Δðh; m t ; w it Þ > 0 and Δðh; m t ; w it Þ < 0:
In order to ensure that there exists only one level of health for which the individual is indifferent between applying for disability benefits and working, we need to make two additional assumptions. The first one states that the value of an accepted application for disability benefits is larger than the value of a rejected application, V AC ðÁÞ > V RJ ðÁÞ. The other assumption concerns the marginal utility of health. We assume that a marginal increase in health is least valuable for an individual receiving disability benefits and it is most valuable for
. These two assumptions together with the fact that p h ðÁÞ < 0 guarantee that ΔðÁÞ is strictly decreasing in health, and we therefore know that there exists a health level below which it is optimal to apply for disability benefits and above which it is optimal to continue working. Let us define this health cut-off level as h CO ðm t ; w it Þ, where
In order to analyze how the composition of the applicant pool changes when stringency changes, we need to know how the cut-off level changes with the average disability benefit threshold, m t . Due to the assumptions made above, we can show that ΔðÁÞ is increasing in m t . An increase from m t to m 0 t leads therefore to an upward push of ΔðÁÞ for given health and, since ΔðÁÞ is decreasing in health, this implies that the health cut-off level increases. The pool of disability benefit applicants increases from all individuals whose health falls in the interval ½h; h CO ðm t Þ to all individuals with objective health in ½h; h CO ðm 0 t Þ. In other words, when stringency decreases, it becomes more attractive to apply for disability benefits and individuals who were previously too healthy to apply find it now worthwhile doing so. The average health among applicants therefore increases when stringency decreases. However, since the sickest non-applicants are now applying for benefits, the average health among non-applicants increases as well when stringency decreases. How the relative health of applicants compared to non-applicants changes when stringency decreases is therefore not clear. In reality, however, applicants constitute at most 1.6% of the population. Therefore, it can be argued that the sickest non-applicants becoming the healthiest applicants has virtually no effect on the large group of non-applicants, while the inflow of those individuals to the relatively small group of applicants increases the average health of the applicants group. Similarly, we can argue that the fact that some applicants will be denied benefits and become non-beneficiaries has only a negligible effect and that therefore the relative health of beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries increases when stringency decreases.
Empirical strategy
To study how the inflow to the DI has been governed over time, we are interested in the relative health of new disability beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, using the ex-post mortality from all years in which the individuals are observed in the future.
The strategy is employed using duration analysis. We assume that, under constant control of program inflow, the mortality of new disability beneficiaries at each age is proportionally related to the mortality of non-beneficiaries and estimate the Cox proportional hazard model λ ic ðaÞ ¼ g c ðaÞ expðβ t D it ðaÞÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n; t ¼ 1; . . . T;
where λ ic ðaÞ is the mortality hazard of individual i in cohort c at age a, g c ðaÞ is the baseline hazard of cohort c and D it ðaÞ is a step function that takes the value one after individual i begins receiving disability benefits at age a in year t, else zero. For an individual who is not receiving disability benefits during the studied time period, D it ðaÞ is zero for all ages. The estimated coefficient expðβ t Þ is the mortality ratio of new disability beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries in year t. A high mortality ratio suggests a stricter control, and a low mortality ratio suggests a looser control of program inflow.
One potential criticism against the empirical strategy is that mortality is a bad measure of individual health. Mortality can be argued to capture a different margin of health than work capacity.
8 For the strategy proposed here, however, health does not need to affect mortality immediately after admittance to the DI program, but only at some point in the future. Another concern may be that the development of mortality over time reflects advances within the health care system rather than the general health of the population. However, the within cohort comparison of mortality allows for such improvements. A final concern may be that admittance to the DI program may have a direct effect on health. We use ex-post mortality as a measure of ex-ante health, and if there is a direct effect of DI recipiency on health, this may affect our estimates. 9 The direction of such an effect is not clear, however. Kuhn, Wuellrich, and Zweimüller (2010) find a significant increase in mortality from early retirement for male blue-collar workers in Austria, but no effect for females. Coe and Lindeboom (2008) find no detrimental effects of early retirement on health and, if anything, a slight shortterm improvement. Moore (2012) finds positive health effects for a subgroup of DI beneficiaries. To employ the empirical strategy, we use administrative data from Statistics Sweden of all individuals in Sweden aged 30-64 between 1985 and 2008 who are not already receiving disability benefits during the first year in which they are observed, in total about 100 million observations. For each individual, we observe birth year, gender and county of residence. We add information about the collection of disability benefits from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and regard the first year of benefits collection as the entry year to the DI program.
10 Finally, we add information about mortality until 2010, provided by the National Board of Health and Welfare. Since individuals are no longer eligible for disability benefits above age 64, we censor the observations above this age. The sampling strategy implies that different cohorts will be observed for different periods of time and at different ages. This problem of length bias sampling is solved by stratifying the baseline hazard by cohort. The cohortspecific baseline hazard also captures changes in the mortality hazard across cohorts that may occur due to, for example, the expansion of education, changes in nutrition or advances within the health care system.
Results

Main results
Figure 2(a) shows the entry rate to the DI program in the population aged 30-64 between 1986 and 2008. The entry rate has varied considerably during the period, between 0.8 and 1.6%. Figure 2(b) shows the estimated mortality ratio of new disability beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries, which indicates how the inflow to the DI has been governed. The dotted lines show the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates, with standard errors estimated by clustering by birth cohort. A mortality ratio larger than one confirms that new disability beneficiaries have been in worse health than non-beneficiaries. The estimated mortality ratio has varied substantially over the period, with a mortality of awarded DI beneficiaries between 2.5 and 4.5 times higher than for non-beneficiaries. The overall picture is that the development of the disability entry rate corresponds well to changes in the estimated mortality ratio. Two explicit changes to formal eligibility criteria were performed during the studied period. These are indicated by the two vertical dashed lines in Figure 2 . The first reform was the removal of eligibility for pure labor market reasons for workers aged 60-64 in October 1991. The second reform was the removal of the special eligibility criteria for workers aged 60-64 and the eligibility for labor market and health reasons combined for workers of all ages in 1997. Before the 1991 reform, the rate of entry to the DI program was stable at a high level. The mortality hazard of new beneficiaries in the DI program was also comparatively low, less than three times as large as that of non-beneficiaries. After the 1991 eligibility reform followed a substantial drop in program entry that is well reflected in an increased mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to nonbeneficiaries. This indicates that the reform indeed impacted how the inflow to the disability program was governed. The second reform in 1997 that further tightened the formal eligibility criteria, however, did not increase the mortality ratio. Although there are some transitory movements in the mortality ratio around the reform, it does not seem to have had a lasting impact on how the inflow to the DI program was governed.
Between 1997 and 2008, there were no further changes to formal eligibility criteria in the DI program. Despite this, program entry was far from stable. Two features of the development are striking. The first is the rapid increase in program entry between 1998 and 2004. Within only a few years, the entry rate to the disability program doubled from 0.8 to 1.6% in the population aged 30-64. The large increase in program entry was accompanied by a steady decline in the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries to a level comparable to that in the 1980s. This supports that the increased program entry was indeed brought about by a looser health assessment of new applicants.
The second striking feature is the remarkable decline increasingly processed at the national center, which allowed the local caseworkers to engage with clients instead of processing benefit forms and medical certificates. The general view is that the decline in the entry rate can be attributed to a gradual improvement in the way existing regulations were being implemented following the organizational changes. The rapid decrease in disability benefits awards from 2004 onward is also reflected in a marked increase in the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to nonbeneficiaries, to higher levels than ever before during the period under study. The mortality hazard of new disability beneficiaries in 2008 was more than four times higher than that of non-beneficiaries. This supports that the declined entry was indeed due to an increasingly restricted access to the program. The analysis shows a close correspondence between the entry rate to the DI program and the estimated mortality ratio of new disability beneficiaries to nonbeneficiaries. Some of the changes over time can be attributed to explicit changes to formal eligibility criteria, whereas others seem to capture implicit changes in the assessment of new applicants. The relative health of new disability beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries does not necessarily capture screening stringency exclusively, however. Program generosity is a different instrument that policy makers can use to change the attractiveness of the DI program. However, the compensation rate has not substantially changed during the period under study. Also the attractiveness of outside options may impact the application decision. The impact of labor market opportunities will be included in the estimates, and our measure can be taken as to capture the ability of the DI program to withstand the influence of outside forces.
Results by subgroups
To shed further light on how the inflow to the DI program has been governed over time, we study the relative development for different subgroups of the population. Several of the reforms to formal eligibility criteria have concerned the age group 60-64. Differences in the inflow to the DI program have also been noted between men and women and in different regions in Sweden. Therefore, we are also interested in the control of program inflow across these groups.
Since the explicit changes to formal eligibility criteria in 1991 and 1997 primarily concerned the age group 60-64, we first divide the population by age. We study how program inflow has been governed across age groups by estimating the model
where the coefficients expðδ a t Þ are the mortality ratios of new beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries in age group a at time t compared to the mortality ratio in other age groups. Figure 3 (a) presents the DI entry rate in the age groups 30-59 and 60-64, and Figure 3(b) presents the estimated mortality hazard ratio of new disability beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries for the age group 60-64 compared to the age group 30-59. The DI entry rate has been higher in the age group 60-64 compared to 30-59 throughout the period, and the relative mortality ratio below one suggests that beneficiaries in the age group 60-64 also have been in better health than beneficiaries in the age group 30-59, compared to nonbeneficiaries of the same age. The variation over time has been substantial, however, and coincides with the eligibility reforms.
Before the 1991 reform, older workers were awarded benefits almost eight times as much as younger workers, and the mortality ratio of older compared to younger new disability beneficiaries was at the lowest level during the period under study. The general decrease in program entry after the 1991 reform was mainly driven by the age group 60-64, for which the entry rate fell from between 6 and 7% between 1986 and 1992 to just above 2% in 1998. Also the mortality ratio of older compared to younger new beneficiaries increased dramatically following the reform and remained at a higher level throughout the period.
11 This further supports that the 1991 reform substantially impacted how program inflow was governed. 11 The transitory spike in entry in 1992 is not reflected in a change in how program inflow was governed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a shortage of caseworkers led to a queue of cases during the preceding years and that the spike in 1992 is due to a shifting of assessments across years. This would explain that the mortality ratio is unaffected.
Around the 1997 eligibility reform, there is substantial volatility in program entry for workers aged 60-64, that is well reflected in the relative mortality ratio of older compared to younger new disability beneficiaries. In 1997, there is a substantial drop in the mortality ratio of older compared to younger beneficiaries. This captures the anticipation effect of the reform that was found in Karlström, Palme, and Svensson (2008) . Applications under the old regime could be filed until 31 December 1996, which means that many of the award decisions were taken in 1997. The significant drop in the relative mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries across age groups in 1997 was followed by a significant spike in 1998, when the special rules had been removed. After that, however, the relative mortality ratio returned to the prereform level, suggesting that the 1997 reform had a transitory but not a lasting impact on the assessment of older relative to younger applicants.
An apparent feature of the marked increase in program entry between 1998 and 2004 and the subsequent decline since 2004 was that women were more affected than men. Furthermore, when the entry to the DI program increased during the early 2000s, focus was put on the regional variation in program entry. This was one concern that motivated the re-organization of the Social Insurance Agency into one central authority in 2005 in order to improve consistency in the administration. To analyze the development across gender and region of residence, we assume a proportional health at each age a in the different populations p. We then have that g c ða; p ¼ 2Þ ¼ g c ða; p ¼ 1Þ expðδ 0 Þ, which gives the proportional hazard model
where the coefficients expðδ p t Þ are the mortality ratios of new disability beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries in one population group at time t compared to the mortality ratio in the other population group. The difference in mortality in general across the groups is captured by the parameter δ 0 .
Figure 4(a) shows that women have been more likely than men to be awarded disability benefits throughout the period. The relative mortality ratio below one in Figure 4 (b) also suggests that the health of new female beneficiaries typically has been better than that of male beneficiaries, compared to non-beneficiaries in the same gender group. 12 The parallel development in 12 Recall that we control for the relatively lower mortality of women compared to men in the population by estimating the parameter δ 0 .
program entry was broken in 1998, however, as both the increase until the mid 2000s and the subsequent decrease were more pronounced for women. From 1998 until the mid 2000s, the relative mortality ratio for women compared to men decreased, suggesting that the large increase in disability benefit awards for women during this period may be explained by a looser screening of new female compared to male disability beneficiaries. The subsequent decline in program entry since 2005 has again led to a convergence in entry rates across gender, and the mortality of new disability beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries across gender also converged. In 2008, there is, for the first time during the period under study, no statistically significant difference in the mortality ratio of new disability beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries across gender. Figure 5 (a) shows the program entry rates with Sweden divided into four parts: the Stockholm region, the southern region Götaland, the middle region Svealand (excluding Stockholm) and the northern region Norrland. The entry rate has been lowest in the Stockholm region and highest in Norrland throughout the period, whereas Svealand and Götaland have had intermediate entry rates. We used Stockholm as a benchmark and estimated the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries in Götaland, Svealand and Norrland compared to Stockholm by including main effects and interaction terms for each region except for Stockholm. The results are presented in Figure 5 (b)-5(d). The relative mortality ratios below one are in accordance with the higher inflow to the program in these regions compared to Stockholm. This suggests that not only differences in the health of the population are behind the differential inflow across regions but also differences in how the inflow has been governed. One point of the 2005 re-organization of the Social Insurance Agency into one central authority was to improve consistency in the administration when it comes to regional variation in program entry. Yet, Figure 5 shows that there is no apparent change in the relative mortality ratio in Götaland, Svealand and Norrland compared to Stockholm after the re-organization of the Social Insurance Agency. The inflow decreased rapidly in all regions, and the relative assessment of new applicants does not seem to have been affected. Interestingly, however, the removal of pure labor market reasons for older workers in 1991 was followed by a convergence in the relative mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries across Swedish regions. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries in Götaland, Svealand and Norrland was significantly lower than in Stockholm. These regions also had a higher unemployment rate and worse labor market prospects on average than the Stockholm region. After 1993, the mortality ratio converged toward the Stockholm level, in particular for Götaland and Svealand, and has since remained at a higher level. This suggests that the removed possibilities of taking labor market reasons into 
Conclusions
Changes in the screening stringency of applications to the DI program are potentially important for explaining program growth. Screening stringency is, however, inherently difficult to observe since it depends on the implementation of program rules as well as formal eligibility criteria. In this paper, we propose an empirical strategy for capturing how the inflow to the DI program has been governed over time, by comparing the health of individuals admitted to the program to the health of individuals not admitted. We use ex-post mortality as a measure of health. This approach allows us to control for changes in the underlying health when estimating fluctuations in program entry. We study the inflow to the DI program in Sweden between 1986 and 2008. Overall, our results suggest that substantial variation in program inflow remains after accounting for changes in the underlying health of the population. We find that the estimated changes in the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries correspond well to the development of the disability benefit entry rate, overall as well as within subgroups of the population. Changes in formal eligibility criteria are well reflected in the mortality ratio. The removal of eligibility for pure labor market reasons for workers aged 60-64 in 1991 can be seen in a substantial and lasting increase in the relative mortality ratio of older compared to younger beneficiaries. Also the removal of the special elderly rules and eligibility for labor market and medical reasons combined in 1997 is reflected in the relative health of new beneficiaries across age groups, although this reform seems to only have had a transitory impact. During the period under study, program inflow was more strictly governed in Stockholm compared to other regions, but the relative mortality ratios across regions converged after the possibilities of taking labor market reasons into account were removed in the 1990s.
We also find large fluctuations in the relative health of new disability beneficiaries during periods of no formal program changes. The large increase in program entry during the early 2000s was accompanied by a steady decline in the relative mortality of new beneficiaries. This supports that the increased program entry was brought about by a looser health assessment of new applicants. The large inflow of women compared to men during this period corresponds to a relatively lower mortality ratio of female compared to male beneficiaries. Most strikingly, the rapid fall in program entry since 2005 is reflected in a substantial increase in the mortality ratio of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries, although no formal changes to the program were being pursued. The turning point in 2005 coincides with the re-organization of the regional Social Insurance Agency offices into one central authority.
